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SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS RULE 4-3(J): NO-MERIT




In Arkansas, appellate counsel who wish to withdraw due to the
lack of merit in an appeal must satisfy both the requirements set by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Anders v. California' and Rule 4-
30) of the Supreme Court of Arkansas.2 The Court in Anders required
that counsel, when faced with an appeal that he believed lacked merit,
file a brief that would refer "to anything in the record that might
arguably support the appeal."3 By requiring counsel to inform the
appellate court of issues that might arguably support an appeal, the
Court was attempting to ensure that counsel acted in the role of an
advocate and adhered to the principle that "[t]he constitutional
requirement of substantial equality and fair process can only be
attained where counsel acts in the role of an active advocate in behalf
of his client, as opposed to that of amicus curiae."4 The Arkansas rule,
however, requires that in addition to filing a brief identifying each
potential issue as required by Anders, counsel must also list each
adverse ruling, even if it does not arguably support an appeal, and state
reasons why those issues do not support an appeal.' The requirement
* Assistant Attorney General, State of Arkansas. Former deputy public defender
and deputy prosecuting attorney. B.A., California State University, Long Beach, 1989;
J.D., University of Arkansas, 1993. I would like to thank David Raupp, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, and deputy public defenders Debbie Sallings and Clint Miller, for
their opinions and guidance in preparing this article. I would also like to thank Articles
Editor Christian Harris for his infinite patience. Of course, any errors in fact, law, or
logic are my own. The opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Arkansas Attorney General.
1. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
2. ARK. SUP. CT. R. 4-30); see Tucker v. State, 47 Ark. App. 96, 885 S.W.2d 904
(1994); Ofechebe v. State, 40 Ark. App. 92, 844 S.W.2d 373 (1992).
3. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. In his dissent, Justice Stewart criticized this
requirement and made the obvious point that "if the record did present any such
'arguable' issues, the appeal would not be frivolous," and that counsel would not have
requested to withdraw. Id. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
4. Id. at 744.
5. The relevant portion of Rule 4-30) reads:
A request to withdraw on the ground that the appeal is wholly without merit
shall be accompanied by a brief including an abstract. The brief shall contain
an argument section that consists of a list of all rulings adverse to the
defendant made by the trial court on all objections, motions, and requests
made by either party with an explanation as to why each adverse ruling is not
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that counsel list each ruling adverse to the defendant avoids Justice
Stewart's criticism in his Anders dissent6 because it does not make a
distinction between arguable and non-arguable issues. Indeed, under
Rule 4-3(j), even if none of the adverse rulings are arguably meritori-
ous, the lawyer must still list each of them. However, by requiring
counsel to argue against his client, the rule, at best, causes him to act
in the prohibited role of amicus curiae. At worst, it turns the lawyer
into a second prosecutor, not advocating for his client, but against him.
In either case, it deprives the client of his right to have counsel that acts
as an advocate.
This article examines no-merit appeals in Arkansas. Part II
provides a background of the development of no-merit appeals and
rules regarding the right to appellate counsel. Part III discusses the
constitutionality of Rule 4-30). Part IV surveys how the rule has
affected appellate advocacy in Arkansas. Finally, Part V briefly
addresses different alternatives to Anders that have been adopted by
other states and suggests that in order to ensure the principles of
"substantial equality and fair process" are met, Arkansas should adopt
a rule similar to one in California that recently withstood constitutional
challenge.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF NO-MERIT APPEALS AND RULES REGARDING
THE RIGHT TO APPELLATE COUNSEL
A. The Right of Appellate Representation for Indigent Criminal
Defendants
On March 18, 1963, the Supreme Court of the United States issued
two historic opinions that have profoundly affected the American
criminal justice system. First, in Gideon v. Wainwright,7 the Supreme
Court held that indigent criminal defendants were entitled to a lawyer
appointed to represent them at trial.8
a meritorious ground for reversal.
ARK. SUP. CT. R. 4-30).
6. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
7. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
8. Id. at 344-45. Until Gideon, it was a common practice of states to provide a
lawyer only in capital cases. See, e.g., Beck v. Wainwright, 147 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1962);
State v. Lane, 128 S.E.2d 389 (N.C. 1962); Commonwealth ex rel. Weigner v. Russell,
177 A.2d 148 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1962); Pitt v. State, 126 S.E.2d 579 (S.C. 1962).
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The second case was Douglas v. California.9 In Douglas, the Court
held that those indigent defendants who were convicted were entitled
to have counsel appointed to represent them during their first direct
appeal.' o After being convicted of thirteen felonies, the petitioners, due
to indigency, sought, inter alia, appointed counsel from the California
District Court of Appeals to represent them on direct appeal." The
appellate court, following California's rules of criminal procedure,
reviewed the record and determined that appointed counsel would not
have been helpful to either the court or the petitioners. 2 Therefore, it
denied the request and affirmed the convictions. 3 The Supreme Court
of California denied discretionary review.14
In vacating the California appellate court's decision, the United
States Supreme Court reiterated that in federal court an appellant has
the right to counsel on direct appeal from a conviction and that
"representation in the role of an advocate is required."' 5 The California
rule, the Court explained, caused an intolerable situation where an
affluent defendant enjoys an appeal "as of right," but the indigent
defendant, "already burdened by a preliminary determination that his
case is without merit, [was] forced to shift for himself.' 6 The Court
ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited such a situation
whereby a "rich man can require the court to listen to argument of
counsel before deciding on the merits, but a poor man cannot.'
' 7
9. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
10. Id. at 357. While the Court noted that states are not required to provide for an
appeal in criminal cases, see McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894), when such
a provision is made, due process requires that counsel be appointed. Douglas, 372 U.S.
at 357. The Supreme Court later declined to extend the right to appellate counsel to
subsequent discretionary appeals. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 617 (1974).
11. People v. Douglas, 10 Cal. Rptr. 188 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
12. The California appellate court did not discuss which rule it was following. Id.
The Supreme Court, however, indicated that the lower court had relied on a specific
rule, but did not identify it. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 354-55.
13. Douglas, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
14. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 353.
15. Id. at 357 (quoting Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674, 675 (1958)).
16. Id at 358.
17. Id. at 357. Of course, this concern is not allayed by current law. Even under
Anders and Rule 4-30), a rich man can fire an attorney who will not file an appeal in
which he argues the merits and hire another who will. An indigent, on the other hand,
will not be in such a position if his counsel follows the rules for withdrawing and the
appellate court agrees with the assessment that no meritorious issues exist. Justice
Souter states the problem eloquently in his dissent in Smith v. Robbins: "Paying clients
generally can fire a lawyer expressing unsatisfying conclusions and will often find a
replacement lawyer with a keener eye for arguable issues or a duller nose for frivolous
ones." Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 294 n.2 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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B. Resolving the Conflicting Duties of Appellate Criminal Defense
Counsel: Anders v. California
The representation of a defendant by appointment at the trial level
poses no ethical problems for lawyers because of the presumption of
innocence. Regardless of the evidence the State has against a defen-
dant, he may plead not guilty and require the State to prove each
element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. 8 On appeal,
however, the ethical situation is changed. While a lawyer must
continue to represent his client diligently, 9 he must refrain from
making meritless or frivolous claims to the appellate court.20  A
dilemma arises when an attorney determines that his client has no
meritorious issues that can support an appeal.' In such a situation, how
does the lawyer balance his client's right to appellate counsel, the duty
18. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970); accord Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 326 (1979) (holding a state inmate entitled to habeas corpus relief if no rational
trier of fact could find proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt); Mullaney v. Wilbur,
421 U.S. 684, 704 (1975) (finding that requiring defendant to prove lack of
premeditation by a preponderance of the evidence violates due process); Harkness v.
State, 267 Ark. 274, 276, 590 S.W.2d 277, 279 (1979) (holding that a jury instruction
characterizing alibi as an affirmative defense, to be proved by the defendant by a
preponderance of the evidence, was reversible error); Peals v. State, 266 Ark. 410, 416-
17, 584 S.W.2d 1, 4-5 (1979) (holding that failure to instruct jury of prosecution's duty
to prove each element of lesser included offenses beyond a reasonable doubt was
reversible error); see also ARK. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2001)
(providing that an attorney representing a criminal defendant may "defend the
proceeding as to require that every element of the case be established.").
19. ARK. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3; see also Clark v. Comm. on
Prof I Conduct, 320 Ark. 597, 898 S.W.2d 446 (1995); Colvin v. Comm. on Prof 1
Conduct, 309 Ark. 592, 832 S.W.2d 246 (1992).
20. ARK. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1; see also Dodrill v. Comm. on
Prof 1 Conduct, 308 Ark. 301, 824 S.W.2d 383 (1992).
21. For a good discussion on ethics for appellate lawyers, see Roger J. Miner,
Professional Responsibility in Appellate Practice: A View from the Bench, 19 PACE L. REV.
323 (1999). Judge Miner suggests that too many attorneys resolve the dilemma in favor
of unworthy appeals: "[F]ar too many frivolous appeals and far too many non-
meritorious issues are presented to appellate tribunals." Id. at 324. Judge Miner notes
that in 1997, eighty-two out of the 850 criminal appeals filed in the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals were filed in conjunction with Anders briefs; in the "vast majority" of
these cases, counsel was permitted to withdraw. Id. at 325. Given this number of non-
meritorious appeals as a starting point, Judge Miner predicts that the total number of
non-meritorious appeals must be very high considering the number of criminal and civil
cases with paying clients. Id. Judge Miner further asserts that "pressing appeals that
have no merit in these times of limited appellate court resources and burgeoning
caseloads is especially irresponsible, for it delays the disposition of meritorious cases
and issues." Id. at 325-26.
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to act with diligence, and the duty not to make meritless arguments?
The Supreme Court answered that question in Anders v. California.22
After being convicted in a California trial court, Anders appealed
to the California District Court of Appeal and requested that an
attorney be appointed to represent him. Although the appellate court
granted the request, the attorney determined that the appeal lacked
merit and informed the court of his opinion by letter.23 Counsel also
told Anders that he could file a pro se brief. Anders asked that another
attorney be appointed to represent him, but that motion was denied and
his conviction was affirmed.24
The Supreme Court of the United States held that the California
procedure did not satisfy the requirements of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.2 ' The Court found that simply writing a conclusory letter stating
that an appeal had no merit did not satisfy "[t]he constitutional
requirement of substantial equality and fair process that can only be
attained where counsel acts in the role of an active advocate in behalf
of his client, as opposed to that of amicus curiae.,
26
In order to satisfy the requirement that counsel act in the role of an
advocate, the Court said, a lawyer who wishes to withdraw due to the
lack of merit in an appeal must file a brief that identifies any issue that
would "arguably support the appeal. ' 27 The Court held that a lawyer
must provide the client with a copy of the brief so that he may raise any
issue he believes to be meritorious. 28 The deciding court would then
determine if counsel was correct and rule on the appeal, or, if it felt that
meritorious issues existed, provide the appellant with assistance of
counsel. 29 The Court reasoned that the requirements would help the
client and the court and would shield the attorney from charges of
being ineffective.3° Importantly for our discussion, the Court also wrote
22. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
23. Id. at 739.
24. Id. The Supreme Court of California previously held that the right to appellate
counsel is not abridged when counsel, after reviewing the record and consulting with
the defendant and trial counsel, determines that there is no merit to an appeal, and after
the appellate court makes an independent examination of the record, is allowed to
withdraw without additional counsel being appointed. See In re Nash, 393 P.2d 405, 408
(Cal. 1964).
25. Anders, 386 U.S. at 741.
26. Id. at 744.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. Presumably, this would be done by either denying the motion to withdraw
or by appointing new counsel.
30. Id. at 745.
2002]
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that "[t]he requirement [of listing all arguably meritorious claims]
would not force appointed counsel to brief his case against his client but
would merely provide the [indigent defendant] that advocacy which a
nonindigent defendant is able to obtain."'"
C. Penson v. Ohio: The Court Further Explains Anders
In the months that followed the Anders decision, the Court
remanded several cases, and ordered compliance with the Anders
standard.32 Anders did not lay the issue to rest, however. More than
twenty years later, the Court was (and is) still explaining what the
Constitution requires when counsel seeks to withdraw from a so-called
no-merit appeal.
In Penson v. Ohio,33 the petitioner's appellate lawyer filed a
document in the state court of appeals that simply stated that he had
reviewed the record and found no errors that required reversal. 34 He did
not file any sort of brief.35 Additionally, the state appellate court
allowed the lawyer to withdraw before reviewing the record for itself.
When it did review the record, the state appellate court expressed its
opinion that the lawyer's determination that there were no credible
issues was "highly questionable.,, 36 Despite the lack of a brief as
required by Anders, and the determination of the state appellate court
that credible issues existed, new counsel was not appointed.37 The state
appellate court concluded that the petitioner had not been prejudiced
because the court would have ruled against him on any colorable
claims.3s
In reversing the judgment, the Supreme Court was direct:
31. Anders, 386 U.S. at 745 (emphasis added).
32. See Smith v. Arizona, 389 U.S. 10 (1967); Fox v. Oregon, 388 U.S. 466 (1967);
Camodeo v. United States, 387 U.S. 575 (1967); Elliott v. Oregon, 387 U.S. 571 (1967);
Barnett v. Nevada, 387 U.S. 243 (1967); Belcher v. Wisconsin, 387 U.S. 241 (1967);
Walker v. Wainwright, 387 U.S. 236 (1967).
33. 488 U.S. 75 (1988).
34. Id. at 77-78.
35. Id. at 78.
36. Id. at 79. The petitioner was charged, inter alia, with two counts of felonious
assault. Id. at n.1. The court of appeals examined the record and found that that the trial
court failed to instruct the jury one on of the elements of felonious assault, and applying
the state's plain error doctrine, reversed petitioner's conviction on one of the two
counts. Id.




It is apparent that the Ohio Court of Appeals did not follow the
Anders procedures when it granted appellate' counsel's motion to
withdraw, and that it committed an even more serious error when it
failed to appoint new counsel after finding that the record supported
several arguably meritorious grounds for reversal of petitioner's
conviction and modification of his sentence. As a result, petitioner
was left without constitutionally adequate representation on appeal.39
The Court rejected the State's claim "that the Court of Appeals'
consideration of the appellate briefs filed on behalf of petitioner's
codefendants" was adequate representation for the petitioner himself.
40
It held that "[t]he right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution
contemplates the services of an attorney devoted solely to the interests
of his client."'' The Court was also unpersuaded by the argument that
any errors were harmless. "[T]he right to counsel is 'so basic to a fair
trial that its infraction can never be treated as harmless error. '42 This
applies no less at the appellate level than it does at the trial level.
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, again stressed the need for the
attorney to act as an advocate when he wrote, "[t]he need for forceful
advocacy does not come to an abrupt halt as the legal proceeding
moves from the trial to appellate stage. '
Thus, in Douglas, Anders, and Penson, the Court insisted that a
defendant who wishes to appeal his conviction is entitled to have an
advocate representing him, not simply an attorney assigned to help
make the process work more smoothly. The Anders Court also
recognized that appellant defense counsel should not be required to
advocate against his client and predicted that a rule requiring counsel
to list all arguably meritorious issues would not violate that policy.'
That prophecy, however, has proven false in Arkansas. 45
39. Penson, 488 U.S. at 81.
40. Id. at 86.
41. Id. at 86-87 (quoting Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942)).
42. Id. at 88 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,23 (1967)).
43. id. at 85.
44. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 745 (1967).
45. See infra Part IV. For an overview of Anders and its promises, see Frederick D.
Junkin, Note, The Right to Counsel in "Frivolous" Criminal Appeals: A Reevaluation of the
Guarantees ofAnders v. California, 67 TEX. L. REv. 181 (1988).
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RULE 4-3(j): THE SUPREME COURT
UPHOLDS A SIMILAR RULE
Although the Supreme Court of the United States has never
specifically addressed the constitutionality of Arkansas Supreme Court
Rule 4-3(j), in 1988, however, the Court did address a Wisconsin rule
of appellate procedure that also requires counsel to list the reasons why
an appeal is non-meritorious. 46 In McCoy v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals,
47
a five to three majority48 ruled that the requirement of counsel to state
the basis for his determination that his client's appeal is non-meritori-
ous did not violate the client's Sixth Amendment right to counsel and
was consistent with the requirements of Anders.49 Not surprisingly, the
three dissenters (Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun) disagreed
on both issues.5" Experience has shown that the dissenters were correct.
After being convicted of abduction and sexual assault, McCoy was
given a court-appointed attorney to represent him on appeal.5 The
attorney reviewed the record and made the determination that there
were no non-frivolous issues to be raised. 2 In his brief, however, he
argued the strongest points he could, but included a statement that he
believed the appeal was frivolous. 5 3 He did not include, as the Wiscon-
sin rule required, any reasons for his conclusion.54 Rather, he indicated
46. The relevant portion of Wisconsin Rule of Appellate Procedure 809.32
provides:
If an attorney appointed under s. 809.30 or ch. 977 is of the opinion that
further appellate proceedings on behalf of the defendant would be frivolous
and without any arguable merit within the meaning of Anders v. California,
the attorney shall file with the court of appeals 3 copies of a brief in which
is stated anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal and a
discussion of why the issue lacks merit.
Wis. R. APP. P. 809.32 (citation omitted).
47. 486 U.S. 429 (1988).
48. Id. at 430, 443-44. Justice Kennedy did not participate in the case. Id.
49. Id. at 443-44.
50. Id at 448-49 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at431.
52. Id. at 431-32. Counsel then gave his client three options: voluntarily dismiss
the appeal, proceed pro se, or let his attorney file a brief presenting the strongest
arguments possible but also advising the appellate court that, in his attorney's opinion,
the appeal was frivolous. Id. McCoy chose the third option. Id. at 432.
53. McCoy, 486 U.S. at 432. The Court expressed disapproval of the brief, noting
that counsel, "in the same document, . . . purported to maintain that there were
arguments warranting a reversal and also that those arguments were wholly without





that he believed "it would be both unethical and contrary to Anders to
discuss the reasons why the appeal lacked merit."' 55 The court of
appeals rejected the brief and ordered a new one filed that complied
with the rule.56 Counsel did not comply with that order.57 Instead, he
sought to have it overturned by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. 58 A
divided court upheld the decision of the court of appeals. 59 The
Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.60
In upholding the constitutionality of the Wisconsin rule,6 the
majority simply made the conclusory statement that the rule did not
place counsel in the role of amicus curiae,62 and that an attorney's
obligation to be an advocate, as a result of the rule, is not diminished.63
Justice Brennan dissented and expressed his opinion that the discussion
requirement went beyond the constitutional and ethical limit prescribed
by Anders.'
55. Id. In his brief, counsel argued that the Wisconsin rule conflicted with Anders,
noting that if he was forced to explain why he felt the appeal was nonmeritorious,
[c]ounsel would no longer be an advocate, as required by Anders, but would
be in the awkward position of arguing why his client's appeal lacks merit.
This would be contrary to the mandate of Anders that his attorney not brief
the case against the client and that the attorney act as an advocate.
Id. at n.2.
56. Id. at 432.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 432-33.
59. McCoy, 486 U.S. at 431, aff'g Wisconsin ex rel. McCoy v. Wisconsin Court of
Appeals, 403 N.W.2d 449 (1987).
60. Wisconsin ex rel. McCoy v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 484 U.S. 813 (1987).
61. McCoy, 486 U.S. at 440-44. The Court held that discussion requirement
constitutional under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court reasoned that the
purpose of the Anders brief was twofold: first, to assure that the appellate attorney
reviewed the record diligently for arguable issues; and second, to assist the deciding
court in determining if counsel's conclusion was correct. Id. at 442. The Wisconsin rule,
which "merely require[d] that the attorney go one step further," served the same
purposes. Id. The Court held that "[a] supported conclusion that the appeal is frivolous
does not implicate Sixth or Fourteenth Amendment concerns to any greater extent than
does a bald conclusion." Id. at 443.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 444 ("Once the court is satisfied both that counsel has been diligent in
examining the record for meritorious issues and that the appeal is frivolous, federal
concerns are satisfied and the case may be disposed of according to state law.").
64. Id. at 445-55 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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IV. ANDERS IN ARKANSAS: APPELLATE DEFENSE COUNSEL ARGUE
AGAINST THEIR OwN CLIENTS
The dissenters in McCoy warned that a rule requiring appellate
counsel to explain his reasons for believing an appeal to be frivolous
would turn counsel from an advocate for his client's interest into "a
friend of the court whose advocacy is so damning that the prosecutor
never responds."6 An examination of a sample of typical Anders briefs
that have been filed in Arkansas illustrates the McCoy dissenters' point.
A. Matthews v. State: Defense Counsel Argues Substantial Evidence
and Lack of Prejudice-Against His Own Client
In Matthews v. State,66 the defendant pleaded guilty to burglary and
theft of property.67 Pursuant to Rule 36.4 of the Arkansas Rules of
Criminal Procedure, he sought post-conviction relief arguing that his
counsel should have requested a mental evaluation, and should have
investigated possible character witnesses.68 Relief was denied.69 On
appeal, his appellate lawyer's Anders brief stated:
[The defendant] did not state how the results of a mental evaluation
and investigating possible character witnesses would have resulted
in a plea of not guilty and in a trial with a more favorable outcome.
.. There was substantial evidence before the Court that [the
defendant's] counsel was effective in his representation. Even if any
errors occurred, no prejudice was shown.7"
Appellate counsel followed Rule 4-30) exactly as he should have.
Consequently, he was forced to argue against his client's interest.
Surely, the McCoy majority could not think that it is in an appellant's
interest for his lawyer to argue any perceived errors were non-prejudi-
cial.
65. Id. at 455 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
66. 332 Ark. 661, 966 S.W.2d 888 (1998) (per curiam).
67. Id. at 663, 966 S.W.2d at 889.
68. Id. at 665, 966 S.W.2d at 890.
69. Id. at 667, 966 S.W.2d at 891.
70. Brief of Appellant at 22, Matthews (No. CR 97-461).
[Vol. 24
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B. Adaway v. State: The Defense Defends the Trial Judge's Rulings
Similarly, in Adaway v. State,7 a jury convicted the defendant of
two counts of second-degree battery and one count of fleeing.72 On
appeal, appellate counsel noted that two objections raised by the
defense at trial were overruled.73 He went on to note that the objections
"were the only objections made during the course of the trial that were
overruled by the court. The defense contends that these rulings were
proper and that no error occurred."74 When addressing an issue raised
by the defendant, pro se, appellate counsel responded that the defen-
dant
has not provided any proof as to the composition of the jury venere
[sic] called in his case, let alone the entire jury pool or master list
from which each venere [sic] is chosen. Without such proof [the
defendant] has failed to make out a prima facia [sic] showing of
racial discrimination in the jury selection process."
Again, appellate counsel complied with Rule 4-30). But to say that in
doing so he was acting as an advocate for his client and not arguing
against him is absurd.
C. Sweeney v. State: Rule 4-30) Compliance, or the State's Brief?.
Appellate counsel in Sweeney v. State,76 arguing the issue of the
sufficiency of the evidence, wrote:
Appellant was the only person at the scene of the crime which
occurred in the early morning hours. The evidence at trial demon-
strated that Appellant had a white substance on his boots and coat,
which was consistent with sheetrock that had been kicked in at the
entry site into the building in question. Sheriffs deputies also found
gloves near appellant which had a similar white substance on them.
Finally, Appellant was wearing a long, black trench coat and light
colored boots when arrested, which the owner of the business
identified as being worn by the perpetrator. Under the standards
71. No. CACR 97-1022, 2000 WL 1349223 (Ark. App. Sept. 20, 2000).
72. Id. at *1.
73. Id.
74. Brief of Appellant at 35, Adaway (No. CACR 97-01022).
75. Id. at 36.
76. No. CACR 99-206, 2000 WL 1751060 (Ark. App. Nov. 29, 2000).
2002]
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governing sufficiency of evidence, the evidence at trial was suffi-
cient to establish Appellant's guilt of commercial burglary.77
Although the above passage is from defense counsel's Rule 4-30)
compliant brief, it could have easily been from the State's brief.
D. Dewberry v. State: No Facts Existed to Grant a Directed Verdict For
My Client
Likewise, the defendant in Dewberry v. State78 was convicted of five
counts of aggravated robbery, five counts of theft of property, and one
count of aggravated assault.79 He had raised the defense of duress.80 In
addressing that issue, and the sufficiency of the evidence, appellate
counsel told the Supreme Court of Arkansas:
This attorney, in his professional opinion, asserts that the Court's
overruling of his motion for directed verdict on all 11 counts was a
correct ruling and that no facts existed to grant a directed verdict on
behalf of the Defendant. Further, that the Defendant has no sufficient
evidence, in fact no evidence, to require a jury to find the affirmative
defense of duress was valid and reach a verdict of not guilty.8
These are only four examples of the effect Rule 4-30) has had on
appellate advocacy in Arkansas. However, they are typical of the briefs
that have been filed in no-merit cases. Each of the appellate counsel in
the above examples followed the requirements of Rule 4-30). Yet, the
briefs read as though the State prepared them. They demonstrate that
the dissenters in McCoy were correct that the rule "forces appointed
counsel to do exactly what we denounced in Ellis and Anders, 82 and
that "[t]he Court today reneges on these longstanding assurances by
permitting a State to force [appellate counsel] to advocate against his
client upon unilaterally concluding that the client's appeal lacks
merit.""
77. Supplemental Brief for Appellant at 3-4, Sweeney (No. CACR 99-206).
78. No. CR 99-1079, 2000 WL 1801865 (Ark. Dec. 7, 2000) (per curiam).
79. Id. at *1.
80. Brief for Appellant at 34, Dewberry (No. CACR-99-01079).
81. Id, at 35.
82. McCoy v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 486 U.S. 429, 449 (1988) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 445 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Eduardo I. Sanchez, Note, The Right
to Counsel and Frivolous Appeals: Assistance to the Court or Advocacy for the Indigent
Client-Which Is the Real McCoy?, 43 U. MIAMI L. REv. 921 (1989).
[Vol. 24
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The majority in McCoy attempted to reconcile the apparent
conflicts with Anders by stating that the Wisconsin rule only required
counsel to go one step further than what Anders required, and that in
doing that, the rule caused counsel to fully review the record and
ensured that no non-frivolous issues were missed.84 Defense counsel in
Arkansas, however, already review the entire record in search of any
issue that is meritorious.85 Filing a brief on the merits of any single
issue is a much easier task than explaining why every adverse ruling
against a client was not error.
In Douglas, the Court found that counsel at the appellate level,
acting in the role of an advocate, were required to do so, otherwise, a
defendant "already burdened by a preliminary determination that his
case was without merit, [would be] forced to shift for himself." 6 Under
the logic of McCoy and the requirement of Rule 4-30); however, it is
not only allowable that he shift for himself, but that he do so after his
own counsel has argued against him. The Anders promise that counsel
would not be required to argue against his client87 has not been realized
in Arkansas.
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
A. Anders Alternatives Devised by Other States and the American Bar
Association Proposal
The Anders formula has not been universally recognized as the best
way to handle apparent no-merit appeals, and several states have
adopted slightly different procedures. 88 These range from not allowing
no-merit briefs at all89 to having the trial court, as opposed to the
appellate court, conduct a review of the record,9" to having an inde-
pendent commission review no-merit cases.9' One state reviews no-
84. McCoy, 486 U.S. at 442.
85. In addition, both the State and the Arkansas Supreme Court are required to
comb the record for reversible error in cases involving life imprisonment or the death
penalty. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-91-113(a) (Michie 1987); ARK. R. CRIM. P. 14; ARK.
SUP. CT. R. 4-3(h).
86. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963).
87. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 745 (1967).
88. For a list of these states and a good discussion on the various alternatives, see
Martha C. Warner, Anders in the Fifty States: Some Appellants' Equal Protection Is More
Equal than Others', 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 625, 643 (1996).
89. Id. at 653.




merit cases, along with all other criminal cases, via summary disposi-
tion wherein the appellate court reviews statements of fact and issues,
a list of authorities, and the trial court file.92 The court then issues a
proposed ruling to which a party may object within ten days.93
There are significant problems with each of these procedures. With
a summary disposition procedure, the reviewing court does not review
the entire trial transcript. Therefore, it is not in a position to determine
if counsel is correct in his determination of what issues are arguable on
appeal. Consequently, there is no guarantee that the client's right to
counsel is being protected.
An independent commission simply adds an unnecessary level of
bureaucracy and does not prevent a rule, like 4-3(j), that results in a
lawyer having to argue against his client. The problem is the same with
having the trial court review the record instead of the appellate court.
It still does nothing to allay the concerns addressed by this article.
Finally, the most disturbing alternative is to simply not allow no-
merit briefs at all. Recently, two authors suggested that the best way to
handle the criticisms and shortcomings of Anders was to adopt the
American Bar Associations suggestion that
[c]ounsel should not seek to withdraw because he believes that the
contentions of his client lack merit, but should present for consider-
ation such points as the client desires to be raised provided he can do
so without compromising professional standards.94
This is wholly unacceptable. Initially, counsel would not be able to do
so without compromising professional standards. It would require, as
the authors admit, that appellate counsel be permitted to act in an
unethical manner by proffering frivolous claims.95 Further, presenting
arguments simply because the client wants them pursued causes a
lawyer to abrogate his duty to use his professional judgment, and may
lead to countless frivolous issues being sent to appellate courts.
96
92. Id. at 657-58.
93. Id. at 658.
94. James E. Duggan & Andrew W. Moeller, Make Way for the ABA: Smith v.
Robbins Clears a Path for Anders Alternatives, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROC. 65, 93 (2001); see
also Randall L. Hodgkinson, Essay, No Merit Briefs Undermine the Adversary Process in
Criminal Appeals, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROC. 55, 64 (2001) (arguing that "the justification
for a no-merit brief system simply does not nearly outweigh the associated costs").
95. Duggan & Moeller, supra note 94.
96. Moreover, forcing an appellate lawyer to advance frivolous arguments against
his professional judgment goes against the holdings of the United States Supreme Court
with respect to nonfrivolous issues. The Court in Jones v. Barnes recognizing that
"[e]xperienced advocates since time beyond memory have emphasized the importance
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Occasionally, there are simply no meritorious issues to be had on an
appeal and the judicial system is not benefited by creating non-
meritorious issues to inundate appellate courts.
B. The Wende Procedure: A Viable Alternative
Perhaps the best balance of the appellate lawyer's duties to court
and client was created by the Supreme Court of California in People v.
Wende. 97 In Wende, the state court approved a procedure that departed
significantly from Anders. A Wende brief does not contain a statement
that counsel believes the appeal is frivolous, nor does counsel ask to
withdraw.98 Rather, he summarizes the procedural and factual history
of the case, and makes citations to the record. 99 Counsel must also
confirm that he reviewed the record, explained his opinions to his client
and provided him with a copy of the brief, and explained to him that he
was allowed to file a pro se brief."° Additionally, the Supreme Court
of California approved the procedure by which counsel would ask the
court to review the record for any arguable issues, and remain available
to brief any such issues.' ' Unlike Anders, the Wende brief does not.
contain an argument on any issues.
The Supreme Court of the United States was called upon to decide
if the Wende procedures were adequate. In Smith v. Robbins,' °2 it found
that they were adequate. The Court ruled that the requirements of
Anders were prophylactic in nature,0 3 and, therefore, "states are free to
of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on one central issue, if
possible, or at most a few key issues," held that appellate defense counsel has no
constitutional duty to raise every nonfrivolous issue requested by the defendant. 463
U.S. 745, 751-52 (1983); cf Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, 528 U.S. 152
(2000) (holding that a criminal defendant enjoys no constitutional right to self-
representation on appeal). When counsel is not obligated to raise all nonfrivolous issues
at his client's insistence (and a defendant has no const itutional right to press such issues
himself), it is difficult to see why appellate counsel should be forced to do so with
regard to frivolous issues.
97. 600 P.2d 1071 (Cal. 1979).
98. Id. at 1075.
99. Id. at 1072.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 528 U.S. 259 (2000).
103. The Court previously stated, when ruling that Anders did not apply to post-
conviction cases in which no right to counsel attached, that "Anders did not set down an
independent constitutional command that all lawyers, in all proceedings, must follow
these particular procedures. Rather, Anders established a prophylactic framework that
is relevant only when, and only when, a litigant has a previously established
constitutional right to counsel." Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987).
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adopt different procedures, so long as those procedures adequately
safeguard a defendant's right to appellate counsel.""
VI. CONCLUSION
The Wende procedures seem the best solution to the sometimes-
conflicting duties appellate lawyers owe to the courts in which they
practice and to the clients whom they represent. The Wende procedures
add no more work for the appellate court because the court already
reviews the record to determine if counsel's finding that the appeal is
non-meritorious is correct. Most importantly, however, it allows the
lawyer to avoid arguing against his client, and to simply argue those
issues that the state appellate court finds appropriate, ensuring that the
lawyer is always acting in the role of an advocate. As Justice Brennan
stated, "[w]hen counsel has nothing further to say in the client's
defense, he or she should say no more."' 5
104. Smith, 528 U.S. at 265.
105. Wisconsin ex rel. McCoy v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 486 U.S. 429, 449
(1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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